$$
\text { No. }: \frac{92020-6}{\operatorname{coA} \text { No.: } 71128-8-1}
$$

KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT NO.: 12-1-06320-2 KNT

IN TAE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT


CLEBKOFTHESGPEMECOURT


STATE OF WASHINGTON, RESPONDENT,


MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

Roosevelt Reed $\because 962757$
Clallain Bay Correction Center
1830 Eayle Crest Way, HA23
Clallain Bay, Na. 98326
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## I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Mr. Roosevelt Reed is the Appellant in this action who is under Judyment and Sentence which is under appeal here. Mr. Reed is currently confined in custody at the Clallain Bay Correction Center in Clallain Bay, Washington.

## II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEN

1. The Appellate Court's Decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedence that Mr. Reed "OPENED THE DOOR" referring to a past relationship being "BAD", not being specific to which relationship or exact time, which allowed in inadinissible evidence without determining the Four Factors Required in Kilyore.
2. The Appellate Court's Decision was unreasonable that the "Strenyth of the State's Case, there is no reasonable probability that any ... Deficient Perforinance by defense counsel affected the verdict." Allowing in past convictions that were not crimes of dishonesty, or found to be a "PATTERN" for the sole purpose of beiny extremely prejudicial, and defense counsel's not objecting or asking for a limiting instruction, was deficient performance that denied Mr. Reed his constitutional right to a fair trial.

## III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ms. Jane Greyory and Mr. Roosevelt conceived a child. Mr. Reed went to prison. Twelve years later, Mr. Reed finds out he has a daughter named Hope Darnell. Later in 2008, Mr. Reed reaches out and contacts Ms. Greyory about their dauyhter. Both nother and daughter visit Reed in Prison and try to establish a relationship where Mr. Reed can get to know his grandkids. In April of 2012, Mr. Reed was released from prison and moved in with Ms. Greyory trying to re-establish their relationship. Ms. Gregory was constantly trying to control Mr . Reed and repeatedly threatened him with calling the cops, he did not acquiesce to her every wish. Mr. Reed saw his parole offer Ms. Stacey Westburg at 3:10 pin and asked Ms. Westburg to not allow Ms. Gregory perinission to pick up his travel perinits in the future and left Ms. Westbury around 4:05 pin. When Mr. Reed arrived home where he found Ms. Gregory had been beaten up. Ms. Gregory was taken to the hospital and treated. Mr. Reed picked her up as she agreed to let him take her hoine. She never said at that point that Mr. Reed was the assailant. After a few days, Ms. Gregory had taken a picture of her facial injuries and sent them over the phone to her and Mr. Reed's daughter. Ms. Gregory told her daughter Ms. Darnell that she had accrued
the injuries in a car accident. Ms. Gregory also lied to a plethora of hospital staff and a social worker that she was injured at her apartment when she answered the door, and "saw a flash of blue." 7 RP 68-69. Mr. Reed had his own house keys and never knocked or rang his own doorbell. When Ms: Gregory had facial re-constructive suryery, Mr. Reed waited on her hand and foot afterward. For six months Mr. Reed acted the perfect mate as he always had since being released froin prison and finding Ms. Gregory unconscious. On September 20, 2012, Ms. Gregory said she was leaving Mr. Reed. Mr. Reed packed his things and left Ms. Greyory instead. Because Mr. Reed had called her bluff and left her, Ms. Gregory went to Spokane and on September 24, 2012, called Mr. Reed's parole officer Ms. Westburg and conspired her revenge. Ms. Gregory admitted she lied, but said it was Mr. Reed who was the one who assaulted her. Ms. Gregory was a woinan scorned. On October 3, 2012 Mr . Reed was surprised and arrested. The trial was a sham. Mr. Reed was paraded as a "PIMP", woman beater, two time convicted assaulter of woinen, drug addict and dealer, and a family nember beater of "H.D.'s half sister's mother" that was not a conviction for beating Ms. Dana Hammond. Mr. Reed's defense counsel was in conflict with Mr. Reed due to


#### Abstract

Mr. Reed wanting his counsel fired for non performance doing no pretrial investigation. Defense counsel allowed clearly prejudicial prior convictions that were inadmissible to help convict Mr. Reed to come in, and when asked by the trial court who asked defense counsel twice, "do you want limiting instructions?" defense counsel did not respond. The court of appeals inade their opinion of it being trial strategy is unreasonable to competent jurists that ever pitched a defense with facts as these and the extremely prejudicial versus probative value. The trial court did not nake the required Kilgore analyses when the floodgates were thrown wide open.


## V. ARGUMENT

When the supposed "DOOR" was opened, the trial court failed to do any balancing, let alone clarify the who, what and when of the statement "BAD" referring to a past relationship, nor what "BAD" meant to Mr. Reed by so inquiring. The trial court did not (1) "Find by a preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct occurred", nor (2) "State the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be introduced",
(3) "Determine whether the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charged", nor (4) Balance the probative value of the evidence against the danyer of unfair prejudice". State V. Kilgore, 147 Wn. 2d 288, 292, 53 P.3d 974 (2002). No witnesses testified to what was or entailed a "BAD" past relationship. The jury went hog wild without a limiting instruction to not use it to infer guilt of past actions but to use it "ONLY" to assess credibility. This evidence is not relevant in proving an element of the crime charged, only prejudice, the trial court made no finding of the probative value being called for versus the danger of prejudice. Not one single factor of Supreme Court Precedence was met. "We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State V. Finch, 137 Wn .2 d 792 , 810, 975 P.2d 967, cert. denied 528 U.S. 922, 120 S.Ct. 285, 145 L.Ed.2d 239 (1999). $\mathrm{EER} \mathrm{404(b)}$ is not designed 'to deprive the state of relevant evidence necessary to establish an essential element of its case', but rather to prevent the state from suggesting that a defendant is guilty because he or she is a criminal-type person who would be likely to commit the crime charged. State V. Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d 168, 175, 163 P.3d 786 (2007) (yuoting State V. Lough, 125 Wn.2d 847, 859, 889 P.2d 487 (1995)).
2. Mr. Reed fired attorneys who would not represent him to their fullest capability. Due to the inherent prejudice of his charges of a man assaulting a woman. Mr. Reed tried to fire his trial attorney to no avail. Mr. Reed unequivocally brought to the attention to the trial court and tried to get his attorney fired. Mr. Reed's attorney labored under duress and simply did not care to do any lawyering after being "stuck" to Mr. Reed. No objecting, not answering the court's obvious yueries of "do you want limiting instructions" where they should be considered mandatory proved this. it is "Automatic Reversal where court requires attorney to represent defendant over attorney's objection based on conflict of interest". Holloway V. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). The lack of performance in axiomatic instances where being a lawyer matters, was factually proven here that Mr. Reed was greatly short-changed. An "ACTUAL CONFLIC̣T" is a "CONFLICT that affected counsel's performance-as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties". Mickens V. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). Trial counsel's failure to stop the jury from considering Mr. Reed's prior convictions that they should never been allowed to consider, to use them to access his credibility is like saying "a wolf won't bite you when it is
starving". Any juror who hears that a man put hands to a woman on two prior occasions is not even going to weigh if the facts are true "THIS TIME". Counsel was deficient under the Strickland standard. Strickland V. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "Trial counsel's failure to object to the adimission of extraneous...offense constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel". Lombard V. Lynaugh, 868 F .2 d 1475 (5 ${ }^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1989). "Trial counsel's failure to object to highly inflamatory inadmissible evidence has no strategic value and failure to request a limiting instruction constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel". Lyons V. McCotter, 770 F.2d 529 ( $5^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1985): Pinnell V. Cauthorn, 540 F.2d 938 ( $8^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1976). Priors cannot be introduced to the jury to prejudice the defendant. Burgett V. Texas, 389 U.S. 109,38 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967).

Mr. Reed did not get a fair trial. His past was paraded against him which influenced the jury. His defense counsel was as dormant as a "bump on a log" as no defense was raised, just a flag of surrender. The overwhelining evidence was all counter-lies of a scorned woinan, her daughter, and sister-in-law-best friend who conspired against Mr. Reed, who left Ms. Gregory for good after much abuse. A fair trial is needed with an attorney who will actually advocate.

Respectfully submitted on June 29, 2015.
signed: Rovrenelt Reed
Mr. Roosevelt Reed,
Pro Se.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.

ROOSEVELT REED,
Appellant.

No. 71128-8-I
DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED
FILED: June 1, 2015

Cox, J. - Roosevelt Reed's severely beaten girlfriend lay bleeding and semi-conscious on the floor of their residence for 33 minutes before Reed finally called 911. During that half hour, Reed made multiple phone calls to his brother and a friend and even checked his voice messages. Although he claimed he told his brother during one call "that someone . . . almost killed the b-i-t-c-h," his brother and sister-in-law heard him say " 1 think / killed the bitch. ${ }^{.1}$ Reed also admitted the assault to his daughter. A jury rejected Reed's claim that the perpetrator was an unknown intruder and convicted him of first degree assault. He appeals, arguing that an evidentiary error and ineffective assistance of counsel require a new trial. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence. And given the strength of the State's case, there is no reasonable probability that any evidentiary error or deficient performance by defense counsel affected the verdict. We affirm.

[^0]Based on allegations that Reed assaulted and severely injured his girlfriend, J.G., the State charged him with first degree assault. The State alleged the assault was a crime of domestic violence, was committed shortly after Reed's release from prison, and was part of an ongoing pattern of abuse.

At trial, J.G. testified that she started dating Reed in the 1980s. They "were into drugs a lot." 2 When J.G. became pregnant, she left Reed because she "didn't want to be on drugs" during her pregnancy. ${ }^{3}$ She later gave birth to a daughter, H.D. Reed is H.D.'s father.
J.G. did not see Reed again until 2008. A friend in prison told her that an inmate, Roosevelt Reed, wanted to speak to her. J.G. and H.D. started talking to Reed by phone and visiting him in prison.

In April 2012, Reed was released from prison and moved in with J.G. in Des Moines. Although they initially had only minor arguments, Reed became increasingly aggressive. He slapped J.G. on one occasion and would say things like "don't take me to that dark place . . . I have this dark place and you don't need to take me there." 4 J.G. knew that Reed had been in prison for "hitting his girlfriend in the head with a brick," and that he "broke the windshield out on some girl that used to be with him." Reed also told her "how he would beat her up" H.D.'s half-sister's mother. ${ }^{5}$

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In early September 2012, J.G. and Reed visited H.D. in Spokane. H.D. testified that Reed was controlling toward J.G., became angry over small things, and called her a "bitch." When Reed asked H.D. for help with his phone, she saw that he had been exchanging text messages with another woman. Later, as they were driving home from Spokane, Reed told J.G. that the messages were about a girl that he had "beat up" years ago. J.G. said the assault was not funny and that was why he went to jail. Reed became angry so J.G. pulled the car off the freeway. Reed then took the keys, drove off, and left her on the side of the road. When J.G. called him and threatened to call the police, Reed returned and drove them home.

The incident at issue in this case occurred the next day. Reed testified that he had lunch that day with his friend Joe Kelley, who then drove him to his appointment with his Community Corrections Officer (CCO), Stacy Westberg. Kelley generally corroborated Reed's testimony. On cross-examination, Kelley conceded that he had refused to talk to a detective on the advice of Reed's lawyer. Kelley was also confused about the timing of events on the day of the assault and did not remember calling or receiving calls from Reed shortly after the assault. J.G. also had difficulty recalling events on the day of the assault and testified that she accompanied Reed to his DOC appointment. Cell phone records, however, suggested that she remained home during that time.

CCO Westberg testified that Reed seemed fine during his appointment until she told him that J.G. could no longer pick up his travel permits and that he had to pick them up himself. Reed became angry and left the office at approximately 4:05 p.m.
J.G. testified that when Reed arrived home they argued, possibly about money. Reed pushed her and she pushed him back. When she reminded him of their agreement not to fight anymore, he pushed her "really hard" into a wall. She then grabbed the gold chain necklace he was wearing and blacked out.

Reed denied arguing with J.G. or assaulting her. He claimed he arrived home and found her lying on the floor. Although she was semi-conscious, bleeding, and so swollen she was unable to talk, Reed did not call 911 because "I wanted to do my own investigation, because I took that personal." He testified that he administered first aid, putting ice on her for the swelling and getting rags and clothing for her wounds. He eventually told her she needed medical attention, but she said "no." Reed testified that he couldn't "force that."

At 4:34 p.m., Reed made the first of a series of phone calls to his brother, Precious Reed, and to Joe Kelley. He called Precious at 4:34 p.m., 4:36 p.m., 4:38 p.m. and 4:39 p.m. He received calls from Precious at 4:37 p.m. and 4:39 p.m. He called his own voicemail and Joe Kelley at $4: 37$ p.m. He received a call from Joe Kelley at 4:40 p.m., and a call from Shantell Reed's cell phone at 4:57

[^2]p.m. Reed did not call 911 until 5:07 p.m., over 30 minutes after his initial call to his brother.

Reed testified that during one of the calls to Precious, he said "man, somebody came in my house and almost killed the b-i-t-c-h. ${ }^{77}$ He explained that "b-i-t-c-h" was not derogatory and "can be considered honorable . . . in the African American language. ${ }^{\text {" }}$ The prosecutor explored this topic further on cross-examination:
Q. But I just want to get this straight. When you think she's actually dying on the floor, you call your brother and said - you called her a bitch then?
A. Yes.
Q. When she's laying there, like half dead, on the floor, you're saying, 1 think someone killed the bitch; right?
A. My.
Q. My bitch? Your bitch? She's your bitch; right?
A. (Witness nods head affirmatively. ${ }^{[9]}$

Precious's wife, Shantel Smith-Reed, testified that she overheard Reed's call to Precious. According to Shantel, Reed said "I need you to get over here" and "I think I killed the bitch." ${ }^{10}$

Detective Fred Gendreau of the Des Moines Police Department testified that he recorded a phone conversation with Precious. On the recording, Precious says Reed called him and said "come over here and get the car; I think

[^3]I killed her. ${ }^{\text {n11 }}$ Precious later said the same thing when Detective Gendreau served him with a subpoena. Precious also said that "what [Reed] did was wrong" and that Reed had an anger problem. During his testimony, Precious reluctantly admitted making the statement in the recorded phone conversation but repeatedly noted that he was using drugs at the time.

Officer Kevin Montgomery of the Des Moines Police Department testified that he arrived at the assault scene at 5:14 p.m. Reed told him he found J.G. lying in the doorway when he got home. Reed told Precious that same day that "somebody kicked the door open."12 Police, however, found no signs of a breakin or missing property.

Officer Montgomery asked Reed if he could account for the time between his departure from the DOC office and his 911 call. Reed said he had "gone to a friend's house to pick up his vehicle. ${ }^{13}$ Reed admitted during cross-examination, however, that he told his CCO that he left their meeting and went straight home.

Officer Anthony Nowacki testified that he tried to talk to J.G. at the scene, but she could not open her eyes or mouth and responded to questions with mumbles and groans. Because they could not communicate with J.G., the police did not arrest Reed at that time.

An ambulance took J.G. and Reed to a hospital where J.G. was treated for multiple facial fractures. She testified that doctors told her she would have been

[^4]killed if she had been hit one or two more times. She described the long-term effects of her injuries, stating:

I can't feel any of my face. I can't feel - I can feel from this part of my lip over. And so like if I drink coffee, I have to put my tongue to it because my lip doesn't have any feeling. And when I talk, my lip doesn't move. It just feels like it has a piece of hard plastic or something in it. It doesn't move.

And as the day wears on, my eye closes down more and more. As far as pain, anytime I lay down, I have migraines, so I'm on morphine for that

I don't know how many plates they have in my face, but I know there's little circles of plates. And I have plates up here. This whole part of my face right here was broke out, so there's plates connecting everything here.

And my jaw was broke up like this. I can't chew any food on this side of my mouth because it feels like l'm chewing nothing because I can't do it. So if I eat the food, sometimes it will get caught up in my lip. I have to clean up. I drink water that has a spout on it. If I drink it on this side of my mouth, it runs out of my mouth.
. . . Usually you have a bone that hooks up into your cheekbone and everything. I'm missing all this bone. It's all metal from under my eye. ${ }^{[14]}$

An emergency room social worker, Margaret Lake, testified that when
Reed approached J.G. in her hospital room, J.G. immediately pulled away from him. Reed angrily told her to calm down. Lake said this was "a real unusual response for a family member."15

The day after the assault, Detective Gendreau called J.G. and Reed answered the phone. Detective Gendreau identified himself as a police detective

[^5]and asked to speak to J.G. Reed asked "why [he] was calling." ${ }^{16}$ Detective Gendreau thought Reed's question was suspicious given that J.G. had just been the victim of a serious assault.
J.G. told several different stories about the assault. She told several people she was attacked by an unknown person in her doorway. She told H.D. that she had been injured in a car accident. Eventually, however, she told H.D. and the police that Reed had assaulted her. She told H.D. "I just can't believe he did me like this. ${ }^{17}$
H.D. testified that Reed admitted his guilt to her during a car ride, saying: "you know I messed up, [H.D.], you know I messed up, you know I have anger issues." ${ }^{18}$ H.D. asked Reed why he hit J.G. even after she was unconscious. Reed replied "I felt like my freedom was jeopardized or at risk, and that I had nothing to lose." ${ }^{19}$ Reed told H.D. that if the truth ever came out, she would have to "watch [her] family's back." ${ }^{20}$ H.D. testified that she did not go to the police because of Reed's threat.
J.G. testified that she initially lied about the assault because she "still loved [Reed], however warped it might have been. That's my kid's dad. ${ }^{\text {n21 }}$ But she began to see things differently when Reed told her he was sick of hearing

[^6]her complaints after the assault. J.G. eventually moved to Spokane where she reported the assault to authorities. The police then arrested Reed.

Once in jail, Reed told Precious in recorded phone calls not to talk to detectives and to hide his cell phone. Reed said "you don't know nothing" and also told Reed to give the phone to defense counsel. Precious expressed concern because the phone was the one Reed called Precious from on the day of the assault. When police eventually recovered the phone, most of the data from the days surrounding the assault were missing and could not be recovered. Reed also instructed Precious to pawn his gold necklace. When Officers later recovered the necklace from the pawn shop, they discovered that the clasp had been broken and put back together.

Reed admitted his criminal past at trial. He testified on direct examination that he had lived on "another side of the law, drugs, alcohol" during the 80s and 90s. ${ }^{22}$ He said that he pleaded guilty in 1993 to assaulting a woman he "ran into . . . in the streets. ${ }^{n 33}$ They were "living a destructive lifestyle, and it was a bunch of cheating on both ends. ${ }^{" 24}$ Reed testified that he was also convicted of assault in 1999 and "was still involved in alcohol and drugs" at that time. ${ }^{25}$

Prior to cross-examination, the prosecutor argued that the defense had opened the door to questions concerning the details underlying Reed's prior

[^7]No. 71128-8-1/10
assaults. She asserted that J.G. and Reed's testimony concerning their former lifestyle opened the door to further questioning on that subject. The court ruled that Reed had opened the door to questions about the 1993 assault, including the fact that Reed was the victim's pimp and that he assaulted her because "she did not put money on his books." ${ }^{26}$

The prosecutor then asked Reed to describe the nature of his relationship with the 1993 victim. Reed said he would rather not answer the question. After the court instructed him to answer, Reed said "I had prostitutes back then. That was part of the lifestyle that I was living in my past." When Reed said he assaulted the woman in 1993 because he felt used, the prosecutor said "wasn't that actually because she hadn't given you money?"27 Reed denied that explanation, but conceded that the victim told police that the assault arose from a dispute over money.

In closing argument, defense counsel said the police botched the investigation by failing to check Reed's hands for injuries, test blood-stained carpeting and clothing, photograph the door and Reed's chain necklace, and take Reed's and J.G.'s cell phones into evidence. Defense counsel also argued that text messages showed that J.G. was angry at Reed for leaving her and keeping

[^8]her car. Counsel maintained that "she wanted to punish him" and did so by changing her original story to implicate him in the crime.

The jury convicted Reed as charged. Reed appeals.

## OPEN DOOR RULING

When a party opens up a subject of inquiry on direct examination, courts have discretion under the "open door" doctrine to allow cross-examination on that subject, including questions concerning otherwise inadmissible evidence. ${ }^{28}$ The doctrine promotes fairness by preventing one party from raising a subject and then barring the other party from further inquiry. ${ }^{29}$ We review decisions under the open-door rule for abuse of discretion. ${ }^{30}$

Reed contends the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the defense opened the door to questions about the role prostitution played in his 1993 convictions. We disagree.

During J.G.'s testimony, defense counsel asked if she was ever jealous of Reed's involvement with other women. J.G. responded:

Not at all. Because when I got with him in Los Angeles, he had another woman. She was in jail. And I know what he claims to be as his profession in life. And so it's like if he had another girl, he's coming home to me every night, I don't care if he gets money from another girl, so what? I mean, that's how we lived. It's kind of sick now. [31]

[^9]Reed did not object to this answer or a similar answer to a subsequent question.
Later, during his own testimony, Reed described his relationship with the 1993 victim differently:
. . I was in a relationship that had went bad. We were living a destructive lifestyle, and it was a bunch of cheating on both ends.

And the young lady that I was charged with assaulting, I had ran into her in the streets, and went up to try to talk to her; she didn't talk to me.

And I wound up breaking the window, and in the process, she got cut by some of the glass, and I was taken to jail for it. And I pled guilty, and did my time, and took responsibility for what I did, because that's how I was living back then. ${ }^{[32]}$

On cross-examination, Reed said his lifestyle with the 1993 victim involved "illegal activities," but declined to say what they were. When the trial court ruled that the defense opened the door to questions about those activities, Reed testified that he "had prostitutes back then. That was part of the lifestyle that I was living. ${ }^{\text {n33 }}$ In light of the prior testimony elicited by the defense from both Reed and J.G., and considering that Reed gave a relatively sanitized description of the lifestyle he led in 1993 and claimed to have left behind, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Reed opened the door to questioning about the details of the1993 assault.

In addition, any error in the court's ruling was harmless. Errors in the admission of prior misconduct evidence are harmless if there is no reasonable

[^10]probability the error affected the verdict. ${ }^{34}$ The references to Reed's involvement in prostitution were brief, cumulative of J.G.'s testimony, and an insignificant part of Reed's admitted criminal history. The evidence of Reed's guilt was also extremely strong, if not overwhelming. There is no reasonable possibility that the court's open door ruling affected the verdict.

## INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Reed next contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an instruction that allowed the jury to consider his assault convictions solely for determining the weight and credibility of his testimony. He also contends counsel should have requested a limiting instruction precluding the jury from using the convictions for propensity. But even assuming defense counsel's performance was deficient, there is no reasonable probability counsel's omissions affected the outcome of the trial.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, Reed must establish both deficient performance and prejudice. ${ }^{35}$ The prejudice requirement is satisfied if there is "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."36 "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ${ }^{n 77}$ There is no

[^11]No. 71128-8-1/14
reasonable probability that the outcome of this trial would have been different but for counsel's alleged omissions.

As noted above, the evidence against Reed was extremely strong, if not overwhelming. His brother and sister-in-law either testified or told others that he said "I think I killed the bitch." J.G. testified that Reed assaulted her and explained why she did not immediately implicate him. J.G.'s daughter H.D. testified that Reed admitted the assault to her. Significantly, despite J.G.'s severe injuries, Reed did not call 911 for at least a half an hour and instead made multiple phone calls to his brother and his friend Joe. He even checked his phone messages. His explanation for not immediately calling 911 was that he wanted to do his own research and that J.G. did not want medical help. Given the severity of J.G.'s injuries, a jury was entitled to decide that these explanations were not credible. Likewise, the fact that police found no evidence of forced entry or missing property severely undermined the defense's unknown intruder theory.

In addition, Reed's post-assault conduct was highly incriminating. He instructed his brother to hide his phone, not to talk to the police, and to pawn his necklace. When police recovered the phone, they discovered that data from the day of the assault and the two days immediately following the assault had been deleted. When police recovered Reed's necklace, the clasp appeared to have been broken and put back together. Reed also acted strangely in J.G.'s hospital

No. 71128-8-1/15
room and she drew away from him when she saw him. When police wanted to talk to J.G. the day after the assault, Reed asked "why?"

Finally, neither attorney mentioned the instruction regarding Reed's prior convictions in closing argument. Nor did counsel suggest that the convictions could be used for propensity purposes or to assess his credibility. In light of the evidence and arguments in this case, there is no reasonable probability that any deficient performance affected the outcome.

We affirm the judgment and sentence.
Cox.J. ,



[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ (Emphasis added.)

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 17, 2013) at 63.
    ${ }^{3}$ Id.
    ${ }^{4}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 18, 2013) at 82.
    ${ }^{5}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 17, 2013) at 82.

[^2]:    ${ }^{6}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 26, 2013) at 342.

[^3]:    ${ }^{7}$ Id. at 339.
    ${ }^{8} \frac{\mathrm{Id} .}{}$ at 341.
    ${ }^{9}$ Id. at 393.
    10 Report of Proceedings (Sept. 23, 2013) at 6 (emphasis added).

[^4]:    ${ }^{11}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 25, 2013) at 245.
    ${ }^{12} \mathrm{Id}$. at 205.
    ${ }^{13}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 17, 2013) at 25.

[^5]:    14 Id. at 89-90.
    ${ }^{15}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 18, 2013) at 121.

[^6]:    ${ }^{16}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 23, 2013) at 69.
    ${ }^{17}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 18, 2013) at 20.
    ${ }^{18}$ Id. at 23.
    19 Id. at 39.
    ${ }^{20}$ Id. at 41.
    ${ }^{21}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 17, 2013) at 95.

[^7]:    ${ }^{22}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 26, 2013) at 303.
    ${ }^{23}$ Id. at 306.
    ${ }^{2} 4 \mathrm{ld}$.
    ${ }^{25}$ Id. at 307.

[^8]:    ${ }^{26} \mathrm{Id}$. at 388.
    ${ }^{27}$ Id. at 390-91.

[^9]:    ${ }^{28}$ State v. Warren 134 Wn. App. 44, 65, 138 P.3d 1081 (2006), aff'd on other grounds, 165 Wn.2d 17, 195 P.3d 940 (2008); State v. Berg, 147 Wn. App. 923, 939, 198 P.3d 529 (2008).
    ${ }^{29}$ State v. Avendano-Lopez, 79 Wn. App. 706, 714, 904 P. 2 d 324 (1995) (quoting State v. Gefeller, 76 Wn.2d 449, 455, 458 P.2d 17 (1969)).
    ${ }^{30}$ State V. Ottega, 134 Wn. App. 617, 626, 142 P.3d 175 (2006).
    ${ }^{31}$ Report of Proceedings (Sept. 17, 2013) at 104 (emphasis added).

[^10]:    32 Report of Proceedings (Sept. 26, 2013) at 306.
    ${ }^{33}$ Id. at 390.

[^11]:    ${ }^{34}$ State v. Carleton 82 Wn. App. 680, 686, 919 P.2d 128 (1996); State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 689, 695, 689 P.2d 76 (1984).
    ${ }^{35}$ Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
    ${ }^{36}$ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
    ${ }^{37}$ Id.

